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This study assesses the impact of competition on quality and price in the English care/nursing 
homes market. Considering the key institutional features, we use a theoretical model to assess 
the conditions under which further competition could increase or reduce quality. A dataset 
comprising the population of 10000 care homes was used. We constructed distance/travel-time 
weighted competition measures. Instrumental variable estimations, used to account for the 
endogeneity of competition, showed quality and price were reduced by greater competition. 
Further analyses suggested that the negative quality effect worked through the effect on price 
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Introduction 
Market mechanisms and competition has been introduced into the long-term care systems of 
many countries, replacing hitherto public bureaucratic, non-profit or other non-market 
arrangements (Fernandez, Forder et al. 2011).  The importance of markets in the care homes 
sector in England has increased markedly in the last 30 years; by 2010 over 90% of all 
placements were made in the care homes market, with only a residual number of (publicly-
supported) residents placed directly in publicly-owned homes (Laing & Buisson 2010). This 
paper seeks to assess the impact of market competitiveness on quality and prices. Whole-
market metrics of concentration indicate that the English care homes market is highly 
competitive (Forder and Allan 2011).  
Despite market forces playing a crucial role in the provision of care homes in England, there is 
very little work that has examined the impact of competition. Forder and Netten (2000) found a 
mean price elasticity of competition for English residential and nursing home placements of -
0.04, while for providers in London authorities the mean price elasticity was -0.08. Gage et al. 
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(2009) found a positive association between price charged and quality ratings, but Netten and 
colleagues (2003) found no relationship between the quality of the home and the likelihood of 
closure, although (low) price was seen as an important contributory factor. 
There is a larger US evidence base on the impact of competition on nursing home price (Nyman 
1994; Mehta 2006; Mukamel and Spector 2002) and quality (Nyman 1994; Zinn 1994; 
Grabowski 2004; Starkey, Weech-Maldonado et al. 2005; Gammonley, Zhang et al. 2009; Zinn, 
Mor et al. 2009). This literature suggests that price effects of competition are small and the 
effects of competition on quality are mixed.1 Studies that looked at the relationship between 
quality and market concentration as measured (predominantly) by a county level Herfindahl 
index found that more competition led to reduced quality (e.g. Grabowski 2004). One study 
(Castle, Engberg et al. 2007) found the opposite. By contrast most studies that look at 
indicators of market contestability – e.g. use of CON regulations and other indicators of excess 
demand – suggest that the least contested markets (e.g. where excess demand can persist) 
produce lower quality. The paucity of appropriate ‘quality’ measures, problems of market 
definition and little account of the potential endogeneity of competition measures are 
limitations of some of the literature.  
This paper examines the impact of competition in the English care homes market. We used the 
population of just over 10,000 care homes in England identified using data from the regulator, 
the Care Quality Commission (CQC). Quality was measured by the CQC’s quality rating of the 
home. The four-category quality rating of the home is determined after inspection visits, 
documentary returns made by the care home and by other data. It covers seven key lines of 
regulatory assessment (KLORA) about the quality of: individual health and personal care needs 
support; daily life and social activities; staffing (training and numbers); environment (safe, well-
                                                     
1 See Forder and Allan (2011). 
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maintained and comfortable); resident home choice and information; management (openness, 
effectiveness and quality assured); and complaints and protection.2 The ratings were publicly 
available and listed on many care home directory websites in addition to the regulator’s 
website. This measure is also a proxy for an underlying quality or utility gain construct. A 
significant positive relationship between quality ratings and the social care-related quality of 
life (SCRQoL) of a sample of care home residents has been found (Netten, Beadle-Brown et al. 
2010). 
We calculated competitiveness/concentration for each home directly, avoiding the need to rely 
on administrative boundaries to identify markets.3 Using homes’ address (postcode), 
competitors were identified, with the total number of competitor places weighted by distance 
(straight-line and travel time adjusted). 
The behaviour of each provider is likely to affect the behaviour of competitors, and therefore 
affect the level of competitiveness locally (Bresnahan 1989; Forder 2000). In principle, 
nonetheless, the level of competition in any given locality will be strongly related to underlying 
demand and supply characteristics, including the factors affecting barriers to entry and exit. 
These characteristics will vary geographically and therefore the competition any one provider 
faces will be a function of these characteristics in its locality and also the characteristics of 
neighbouring localities (as they also affect the circumstances of competitors). Summary 
statistics of the latter can serve as instrumental variables to address the endogeneity problem. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II discusses the institutional characteristics 
of the care homes market. Section III develops a conceptual model to link the empirical analysis 
                                                     
2http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100812003411/http://cqc.org.uk/_db/_documents/klora_care_homes_20
0903181530.doc. 
3 Local authority-funded residents can be placed outside of the funding council’s administrative boundary. In 2008, 
26,220 (14.4%) supported over-65 residents were placed ‘out of area’ (NHS Information Centre 2008). 
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to the underlying economic theory. Sections IV presents and discusses the data, and the results 
of the analysis follow in section V. The implications of the main findings are then discussed. 
Institutional characteristics of the care market 
The care homes market has two main groups: (1) publicly-supported residents where services 
are commissioned by public authorities (local councils) on behalf of service users; and (2) self-
payers (those who do not qualify for public support).  In 2010 40% of placements in private (for- 
and non-profit) care homes in England were self-funded. Other than a small proportion of 
placements made by the National Health Service (around 8%), the remaining placements were 
made by commissioners in local councils. 
By and large, the self-pay market can be regarded as a conventional market, although all 
homes, regardless of payer, are required to meet minimum quality standards (assessed as 
outlined above) or face sanctions, including removal of operating licences. The publicly-
supported market is a quasi-market (Bartlett, Propper et al. 1994). There is a wealth-based 
means-test whereby people with eligible assets (including housing assets for single person 
households) below a certain threshold receive council financial support (Wanless, Forder et al. 
2006). 
There are 152 councils in England that commission long-term care services. Exact 
commissioning practice varies between them, but generally involves the following process. 
Commissioners negotiate with care homes that are prepared to offer services in line with the 
council payment rate for that locality and other conditions. Local authority-supported 
placements are then made according to these terms for individual placements. In some cases, 
councils may block purchase places in advance. The contractual terms require that the home 
meets the minimum quality standards, but they generally do not involve any considerations for 
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higher quality beyond that level. There are no restrictions that the care home needs to be 
within the council’s boundaries. On this basis, demand from councils is unlikely to be affected 
by quality choices made by homes above minimum quality. 
Local authority commissioners work with potential LA-funded residents to find a place in their 
preferred care home. Potential residents are able to choose potential homes as long as the 
home meets the council’s contractual terms. In this process, commissioners will focus on 
finding a vacancy in a care home that meets the minimum standards. We might expect 
potential residents to be influenced by the quality of homes they wish to use, but also by other 
factors, particular the home’s location. Since a care home admission is usually prompted by 
some health crisis (sometimes described as a ‘distressed purchase’), the availability of a 
vacancy in any local home is often seen as an overriding priority.  
Individuals are often required to make a contribution to the local authority for their placement, 
but the amount of the charge reflects the person’s means, not the characteristics of the 
placement (Wanless, Forder et al. 2006). Some councils also allow supported residents to opt 
for higher priced homes if a third-party (not the resident) can be found to pay the difference 
over the council price.4 This could also mean that demand is affected by quality although the 
demand for higher quality would be tempered by the need for a third-party to pay a top-up on 
the price.  
Local authorities appear to have some market power as suggested by the discounts they 
apparently secure compared to self-pay rates (Office of Fair Trading 2005). Similar price 
differentials are seen between public (Medicaid) and private payers in the US nursing home 
market (Grabowski 2004; Mukamel and Spector 2002). 
                                                     
4 The extent of topping up is unclear but as many as one third of local-authority funded placements could involve top-ups 
(Laing & Buisson 2010). 
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Self-payers have more freedom to choose homes at their preferred price-location/type-quality 
point, but it is worth noting that almost all homes currently operate with a mix of self-pay and 
local authority residents (Laing & Buisson 2010). As such, local authority commissioning 
practices are likely to influence self-payer purchasing options. 
The NHS also funds places in care homes, but without charges (or third-party top-ups) for 
residents. The process and terms are similar to LA-funded placements, although the prices that 
the NHS will pay are often slightly higher.  
Much of the industry comprises single home providers or small multi-home organisations, 
although there are some large chains. Around 15 per cent of the market is supplied by non-
profit providers. However, many ‘for-profit’ providers, particularly the single home or small 
multi-home organisations can be regarded as having some non-profit motivation (Matosevic, 
Kendall et al. 2000; Knapp, Hardy et al. 2001; Netten, Darton et al. 2001; Kendall, Matosevic et 
al. 2003). 
Theoretical considerations 
The care homes market can be characterised as monopolistically competitive with both 
horizontal and vertical differentiation. In general in the literature, the effects of increased 
competition on quality are ambiguous a priori in this case (Tirole 1988 ; Gaynor and Town 2011; 
Propper and Leckie 2011). We use a simple model – based in part on that of (Gaynor and Town 
2011, p 52) – to consider whether the key institutional features outlined above add further 
insight to the standard result. 
Demand for care home services is influenced by the level of disability and ill-health in the 
population (𝜎𝑖) and by the wealth of potential service users (𝜃𝑖) (Darton, Forder et al. 2010). 
The latter will have a negative effect on council demand and a positive effect on self-pay 
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demand (due to the means-test on public support). Moreover, an increase in the number of 




< 0.  
Suppose that the profits of care home 𝑖 are: 
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖
𝑐𝑥𝑖
𝑐(𝑞𝑖, 𝑑𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖
𝑐, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖) +  𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑥𝑖
𝑠(𝑞𝑖, 𝑑𝑖, 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 , 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖) − 𝑐𝑖(𝑞𝑖)(𝑥𝑖
𝑐 + 𝑥𝑖
𝑠) − 𝐹(𝑞𝑖) (1) 
Where 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 are prices and 𝑥𝑖
𝑘  demand from councils purchasers (𝑘 = 𝑐) and self-pay purchasers 
(𝑘 = 𝑠). Homes set one level of quality5 𝑞 ≥ 𝑞 at or above the minimum 𝑞 enforced by the 
regulator, and operate in one location 𝑑. Marginal costs 𝑐𝑖 generally rise with quality, as do 
(sunk) fixed costs 𝐹. For convenience, we assume that 𝐹 (𝑞) = 0, and 𝐹𝑞 > 0 and 𝐹𝑞𝑞 > 0. 
We assume that providers maximise utility, 𝑍𝑖: 
 𝑍𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖) + 𝑚𝑖(𝑞𝑖)𝑥𝑖 (2) 
which includes profits but also reflects non-profit motivation in form of gaining utility from 
quality (𝑚𝑞 > 0, 𝑚𝑞𝑞 < 0) with 𝑚 ( 𝑞) = 0. Note that 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
𝑐 + 𝑥𝑖
𝑠. 
The dominant purchasing power of the council purchaser allows a degree of price setting as 
regards 𝑝𝑖
𝑐. In this case we assume that the council price is set through a collective bargaining 
process. Suppose that this process results in prices set at: 𝑝𝑐 = 𝑐𝑖 (𝑞) + 𝜂(𝑁) = 𝜌(𝑁). Here 
𝜂(𝑁) > 0 is a market power function with 𝜂𝑁 ≤ 0 and where prices fall slowly with 𝑁 so that 
no provider experiences a demand increase when new providers enter the market. We also 
assume that the council price does not vary with quality above the minimum i.e. 𝜌𝑞 = 0. 
                                                     
5 We assume a single quality at the home level. It might be possible for homes to differentiate quality in terms of 
amenities like room size between residents but our definition of quality is more fundamentally covering many aspects of 
quality of life of residents. 
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Providers are left to choose self-pay price and quality (after the location decision).  The first 
order condition with respect to quality choice is: 
𝑍𝑞 = 𝜌𝑖𝑥𝑞





𝑠 + (𝑚𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)𝑥𝑞𝑖
𝑠 + (𝑚𝑞𝑖 − 𝑐𝑞𝑖)𝑥𝑖 − 𝐹𝑞𝑖 = 0 (3) 
with the equivalent for price. Solving the first order conditions together gives optimal quality 
and price in partial reduced form: 𝑞𝑖
∗ = 𝑞𝑖
∗(𝑁𝑖, 𝑑𝑖, 𝜎𝑖 , 𝜃𝑖) and 𝑝𝑖
𝑠∗ = 𝑝𝑖
𝑠∗(𝑁𝑖, 𝑑𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖, 𝜃𝑖). Council-
funded places will be priced at: 𝑝𝑖
𝑐∗ = 𝜌(𝑁𝑖, 𝑑𝑖, 𝜎𝑖, 𝜃𝑖).  
Since council purchasers are not (much) interested in quality above the minimum in this model 
(i.e. assuming that 𝑥𝑞
𝑐 = 0, 𝑞 > 𝑞, in the limit case), quality in markets with a high proportion of 
council-funding eligible people is likely to be lower than quality in markets with a high 
proportion of potential self-payers (who do care about quality). The proportion of council 


















𝑠 + (𝑚𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)(𝑥𝑞𝑁
𝑐 + 𝑥𝑞𝑁
𝑠 )




where 𝜌𝑁 < 0 and 𝑥𝑁
𝑐 < 0. The sign of this function is indeterminate without further 
assumptions. 
With a range of payer types with differing preference for quality, the market is likely to stratify 
by quality. The impact of competition is clearer when we focus just on markets with 
predominantly council-supported payers i.e. those markets with low population wealth 𝜃𝐿. 
                                                     






 , using Cramer’s rule over the implicit functions, i.e. 𝑍𝑝(𝑞, 𝑝, 𝑁, 𝑑, 𝜎) = 0 and 
𝑍𝑞(𝑞, 𝑝, 𝑁, 𝑑, 𝜎) = 0.  
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Consider the limit case of homes that only secure council-supported residents (and where there 
are no third-party top-ups involved). Suppose also that council-funded purchases are 
completely unconcerned with quality above the minimum, such that 𝑥𝑞
𝑐 = 0 (and so 𝑥𝑞𝑁
𝑐 = 0). 
Using the first order condition (3) at 𝑥𝑠(𝜃𝐿) = 0, and substituting into (4), we have: 
𝑍𝑞𝑁(𝑥𝑖









𝑠 ] + (𝑝𝑖









The first two terms are likely to be negative, but the last is positive7: following an increase in 
competition, there is an incentive to raise quality and thereby secure more financially lucrative 
self-payers. But this effect is mitigated somewhat by the lower self-pay prices available after 
greater competition and the reduced number of residents over which to spread the extra fixed 
costs of quality. If the potential to attract self-payers is effectively zero e.g. 𝑥𝑞
𝑠(𝜃𝐿) = 0, then 
(5) reduces to: 𝑍𝑞𝑁(𝑥𝑖




< 0. With usual concavity assumptions, 𝑍𝑞𝑞
𝑐 < 0, the 







𝑐 < 0 i.e. increased competition reduces quality. 
With extra competition, homes face lower demand and have less opportunity to spread the 
additional (fixed) costs of extra quality. Providers choose quality above the minimum because 
they value quality – with 𝑞𝑖
∗ set by (𝑚𝑞𝑖 − 𝑐𝑞𝑖)𝑥𝑖 = 𝐹𝑞𝑖. It is also possible that the break-even 
constraint will bind at quality levels below 𝑞𝑖
∗, however. Indeed, as competition increases and 
the council price 𝜌 tends to the marginal cost level, so quality is constrained down towards the 
minimum. Even in local markets with some self-payer demand, quality may be constrained 
downwards by the effect of additional competition lowering 𝜌 if the potential number of self-
payers is limited: As 𝑁 → ∞, any quality above the minimum would incur a loss on council-
                                                     
7 As based on the model by Gaynor and Town, whereby demand for home 𝑖 is given by the product of market share 𝑠𝑖  and 
total market demand 𝐷𝑖, that is: 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖(𝑞𝑖)𝐷(𝑞𝑖) and 𝑥𝑞 = 𝑠𝐷𝑞 + 𝐷𝑠𝑞. Here 𝑠𝑞 > 0 and we would expect 𝑠𝑞𝑁 > 0 (in that 
for a monopolist 𝑠𝑞(𝑁 = 1) = 0, as 𝑠(𝑁 = 1) = 1 and in a more competitive market, 𝑠𝑞(𝑁 > 1) > 0). With 𝐷𝑞 → 0, this 
suggests that 𝑥𝑞𝑁 = 𝐷𝑠𝑞𝑁 + 𝑠𝑁𝐷𝑞 > 0. As regards price, for a monopolist, 𝑝𝑞(𝑁 = 1) = 𝑃𝑞 > 0 where 𝑃𝑞 is the maximum 
increase in price that the market will pay for increased quality. For a competitive market, 𝑝𝑞(𝑁 > 1) ≤ 𝑃𝑞 so 𝑝𝑞𝑁 ≤ 0. 
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funded clients and this would have to be offset by profits on self-pay clients. If there were few 
self-payers quality would be constrained to be near to the minimum. With decreasing average 
costs (with scale) providers in this case would not just focus on the self-pay market.   
In practice we would expect: council-funded purchasers to be somewhat concerned with 
quality; for there to be some sensitivity of self-pay demand even at the low end of the market; 
and for providers to operate with a mix of payers. Therefore, the effects of increased 
competition will be generally ambiguous. Nonetheless this limit case result does show that a 
negative effect is possible in this model. 
Competition 
In keeping with the literature on monopolistically competitive markets, we can assume that 
local markets tend to zero profits in order to define the number of providers in the long-run. 
Suppose that care home 𝑖 operates in local market 𝑔, which can be defined as including any 
purchasers and other providers within range of home 𝑖.8 The number of beds supplied to that 
market in the long run, differentiating payer type, 𝐵𝑘, is determined where average profits of 
homes in the market are zero, and can be found by solving the system: 
 𝜋𝑔
𝑉(𝜃𝑔, 𝜎𝑔, 𝑑𝑔, 𝐵𝑔
𝑐, 𝐵𝑔
𝑠, 𝜃−𝑔, 𝜎−𝑔, 𝑑−𝑔, 𝐵−𝑔
𝑐 , 𝐵−𝑔
𝑠 ) = 𝐹(𝜃𝑔, 𝜎𝑔) (6) 
where the −𝑔 subscript refers to any market other than 𝑔 that influences behaviour in 𝑔.  The 
term on the left hand side is profit with respect to variable costs only. Total beds supplied is: 
𝐵𝑔 = 𝐵𝑔
𝑐 + 𝐵𝑔
𝑠. The level of competition in market 𝑔 is then 𝑁𝑔 = 𝑁𝑔(𝐵𝑔). 
Given home 𝑖’s quality and price, the level of competition faced by home 𝑖 will be directly 
correlated with 𝑁𝑔 i.e.: 
                                                     
8 In other words each ‘market’ is unique to provider i.  
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 𝑁𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖(𝑁𝑔(𝑞𝑖, 𝑝𝑖), 𝜃𝑔, 𝜎𝑔, 𝑑𝑔, 𝜃−𝑔, 𝜎−𝑔, 𝑑−𝑔) (7) 
Generally we would expect the number of competitors to increase with need-related 
characteristics 𝜎𝑔, such that 
𝜕𝑁𝑖
𝜕𝜎𝑔=𝑖
> 0. However, the effect of an increase in wealth 𝜃𝑔 is more 
difficult to anticipate, not least because the effect on beds supplied to meet council-funded 
demand is likely to be opposite the effect on beds for self-payers. We cannot sign 
𝜕𝑁𝑖
𝜕𝜃𝑔=𝑖
 a priori. 
Hypotheses 
We have the following main empirical hypotheses: 
H1. In general the effect of competition on quality is ambiguous. However, there are 
circumstances where markets with predominantly council-funding could show a 
negative relationship between quality and competition i.e. 
𝜕𝑞𝑖∈𝐶
𝜕𝑁𝑖
< 0 where 𝐶 is the set 
of markets 𝑔 where council funding dominates.  
H2. In council-funded only markets, the impact of competition on quality works through 
price, and therefore 
𝜕𝑞𝑖∈𝐶
𝜕𝑁𝑖
(𝑝𝑖(𝑁𝑖)) = 0 
H3. For the self-pay market, we cannot sign the differential 𝑞𝑁




H4. For the whole market we hypothesise that 𝑝𝑁
∗ < 0. This is a standard result where prices 
are set by providers or follows from our definition of 𝑝𝑐 = 𝜌 (𝑁𝑐 , 𝑞) when prices are set 












2 as a competition 
measure (with weight 𝑤𝑖𝑗). The HHI is inversely correlated with the number of competitors 𝑁𝑖 
in a market and therefore the signs of our above hypotheses are reversed with respect to 𝐻𝑖. 
Note that, if providers all operated with the same output (beds), the HHI reduces exactly to an 
inverse measure of the number of competitors: 𝐻𝑖 =
𝑁(𝑤𝑖𝐵𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
2




.   
We sought to account for the horizontal differentiation of providers by weighting output for 
distance and/or for travel times: Δ𝑑𝑖𝑗 = |𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑𝑗||0.5𝑡𝑖 + 0.5𝑡𝑗| for all 𝑗, where 𝑡 is the 
normalised predicted travel time per kilometre for the local authority where care home 𝑗 is 
located. We used an inverse square-root weighting on distance and travel time in the 
Herfindahl, i.e. 𝑤𝑖𝑗 =
1
Δ𝑑𝑖𝑗
0.5. Furthermore, a maximum range for competitors was implemented; 
providers located outside this range were assumed to have no competitive effect (which 
therefore defines 𝑁𝑖). Ranges of 10 and 20km were used with their travel time-weighted 
equivalents. Potentially, the impact of competitors should also be weighted in terms of the 
vertical differentiation of providers, but with a categorical quality classification of providers in 
the data, the intuitive basis for weighting in this case is less strong. Our strategy was to proceed 
without re-weighting for quality differences, although we did use exogenous shift factors for 
quality in the model. 
Similarly, we might want to make allowance for different ‘types’ of provider e.g. primary client 
type, home type (nursing vs residential), organisational affiliation, and also for location by 
council administrative area. We proceeded in this case, by using intercept dummies for type 
rather than modifying the competition weight. Ideally we would weight the distance variables 
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between each home of the same type to be greater than between homes of different types. We 
might have also weighted competition differently if competitor beds were in a different local 
authority (especially relevant for those near boundaries). Although there is no restriction on 
local authorities funding placements in homes outside the authority area, it is possible that any 
differences in LA policy might work through as a competition effect. This effect would be 
modest if neighbouring local authorities tend to adopt similar policies, as anecdotal experience 
suggests. The general problem was that the resultant matrix of weights for these effects would 
quickly become complicated with arbitrary weights.  
The partial reduced-form equations – the solutions to (3) – for quality can be used in the 
estimation, substituting the HHI (𝐻𝑖) for 𝑁𝑖 
 𝑞𝑖
∗ = 𝑞𝑖
∗(𝐻𝑖, 𝜎𝑖, 𝜃𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖
𝑞 (8) 
We only observe home-average price, 𝑝𝑖, not price by payer-type in the data and therefore we 
combine the reduced-form price equations above to give: 
 𝑝𝑖
∗ = 𝑝𝑖
∗(𝐻𝑖, 𝜎𝑖, 𝜃𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖
𝑝 (9) 
There is a potential to see spurious associations between quality and our competition variable 
in the data. Suppose that competition is greater for markets with mostly council-funded 
demand compared to markets with mostly self-pay demand, such that 
𝜕𝐻𝑖
𝜕𝜃𝑖
> 0. Furthermore, as 




> 0. Any omitted wealth-related factor in (8) or (9) may 
then result in an apparent positive relationship between HHI and quality (i.e. 
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝜕𝐻𝑖
> 0) that was 
due to differences in payer composition rather than a competition effect. It is important 
therefore to control for exogenous factors, and in particular to include variables for all wealth-
related factors 𝜃𝑖  in the empirical model. 
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The dependence of 𝐻𝑖 on (own) price and quality suggests that there will be non-zero 
correlation between Hi and the error term 𝜀𝑖 in (8) and (9). This endogeneity can be addressed 
using instrumental variables where the predicted value of the competition measure is used in 
(8) and (9).  We have 𝐻𝑖 = 𝐻𝑖(𝑁𝑔(𝑞𝑖, 𝑝𝑖), 𝜃𝑔, 𝜎𝑔, 𝑑𝑔, 𝜃−𝑔, 𝜎−𝑔, 𝑑−𝑔) from (7) using the HHI in 
place of 𝑁𝑖, and therefore the terms 𝜃−𝑔, 𝜎−𝑔, 𝑑−𝑔 can be potentially used as instruments, 
predicting 𝐻𝑖 but not directly appearing in the structural equations (8) and (9), given 𝐻𝑖. We 
cannot observe these terms exactly but can instead substitute using a vector of demand and 
supply characteristics summarising the local areas in which competitors operate – see data 
below. 
The two step efficient generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimator was used to estimate 
equations (8) and (9). A log of price was used in the estimation. Both a two step GMM linear 
probability model (LPM) and an ordered probit model were used for the multi-category quality 
variable. In the latter case, the predicted value of HHI from a first stage estimation was used in 
the probit estimation. The whole system was bootstrapped (1000 reps) to produce standard 
errors for the coefficients. 
We specifically consider hypothesis H2 using the following structural model for quality: 
 𝑞𝑖
∗ = 𝑞𝑖
∗1(𝐻𝑖, 𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖), 𝜎𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖
𝑞1 (10) 
In view of the endogeneity of price, we substituted its predicted value into (10) using a first-
stage reduced-form estimation.  
Data 
Price data comes from the Laing & Buisson Care Homes Contacts dataset which contains 
information on all care homes across the United Kingdom in July 2010. The CQC dataset of 
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registered adult social care services at September 30th 2010 contains 10,470 registered care 
homes for older people. Using postcode, number of registered beds and telephone numbers we 
were able to match 98.4% of these care homes with the Laing & Buisson dataset giving a 
dataset of 10,302 care homes in England.  
Figure 1 shows the average level of competition in England at the Medium-level Super Output 
Area (MSOA) level. MSOA level of competition is found by taking the average level of 
competition (HHI) from all the care homes that are located in each MSOA; in this case we used 
the travel time-weighted HHI at a 10km range. All 10302 care homes were located in 4588 (out 
of 6781) MSOAs. The figures are scaled according to the official measurement of competition 
where a market with a HHI of less than 0.1 is considered competitive, over 0.1 is considered 
concentrated, and over 0.2 is considered highly concentrated (Competition Commission and 
Office of Fair Trading 2010).  
Distance weighting of the HHI shows markets to be more concentrated/less competitive than 
they would be with no distance weighting – even so, we see a high level of competition 
indicated. With a market size defined by a radius of 10km, 4,152 MSOAs (90.50%) have an 
average level of competition that would be considered to be competitive by the OFT. If market 
size were extended to a 20km radius then only 10 (0.22%) MSOAs have an average level of 
competition that is non-competitive according to the OFT. 
Regarding price data, only summary (average) home level statistics are available, although 
there is a good degree of heterogeneity between homes on this measure.9 Quality is measured 
using the CQC’s four-level quality ratings (‘star ratings’) measure. Previous studies have shown 
                                                     
9 The L&B prices directory contains minimum and maximum prices by room type (single and shared) and client-type 
(nursing or residential). As such, any third party top-ups will be included in the price data but cannot be discerned. A 
blended (mean) price was constructed by taking the crude average of minimum and maximum price for the service (client 
and room) types available in the home. Information on the number of beds of each type for each home was not available, 
only whether or not the service was provided. 
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a reasonable degree of inter-rater reliability in this assessment (Darton, Forder et al. 2010). In 
view of the low number of 0-rated homes (1.7%), this category was combined with 1-star 
homes.10 Table 1 reports price and quality descriptive information for the sample, including the 
crude relationship between price and quality. 
To account for demand and cost-shift factors (𝜃𝑖, 𝜎𝑖), a range of home-level variables were 
used, including: primary client type (dementia or old age); home type (nursing home or 
residential home); organisational affiliation (multi-home organisations); whether the home was 
purpose built and length of time in business.  
In addition, we matched in characteristics pertaining to the neighbourhood of the home. 
Specifically, we used National Statistics data collected using standard geographical 
classification, called super output areas. There are just over 32,800 Lower-layer super output 
areas or LSOAs in England. Matching to the address of each care home, we used averages for: 
total population, percentage of older people in the population, percentage of population with a 
long-term limiting illness, percentage reporting their health as fairly good, percentage of older 
population that received pension credit (a means-tested pension top-up), percentage living 
alone, and ranking on the multi-deprivation scale. Furthermore, to account for market 
composition two variables were included: first, using transactions data on house sales from the 
Land Registry, average house price for LSOAs was used; and second, a basic estimate of the 
proportion of care home residents that are self-funded in each Local Authority.11 Descriptive 
statistics are in Table 2. 
                                                     
10 Homes that are rated as having 0 stars would have to make improvements to their care home or else face further 
sanctions, which could include loss of registration (closure). As such, it seems reasonable to join these two star ratings 
together. 
11 See Forder and Allan (2013). 
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Care homes are located into 9 regions (London, East Midlands, East of England, South East, 
North East, North West, South West, West Midlands and Yorkshire and the Humber). 
The matched database has 9609 independent sector (non-public) homes. Price data were 
missing for 483 of these homes (5.0%). Approximately 1% (n=82) of prices in the data were very 
low, and so likely to have been in error/miscoded, being below any feasibly sustainable price. 
There were also 10 homes with prices over £2000 per week; as these are likely to be specialist 
providers and therefore not in competition with other care homes in their market area, they 
were also excluded. 329 of the care homes were not primarily aimed at either older people or 
people with dementia and a further 14 cases had missing home level data (e.g. registration 
year) or local house price data, giving 8691 cases for the price analysis (9.6% missing). Quality 
ratings were missing for 208 of these homes giving 8483 for the quality analysis (11.7% 
missing).  
Instruments 
The instruments in the model (i.e. 𝜃−𝑔, 𝜎−𝑔) concern characteristics of markets beyond home 
𝑖’s local market. For this purpose we used indicators summarised at larger geographies, 
specifically for middle-level super output areas (MSOA): MSOA-average house price, the MSOA-
average multiple deprivation score and the percentage of long term ill in the MSOA-level 
population. The LSOA-level versions of these indicators are included as exogenous variables in 
the price and quality estimations; it is assumed that any remaining impact from the MSOA level 
will only affect competition. 
The instruments used for the price estimation in (10) were: MSOA-average house price, the 
MSOA-average multiple deprivation score and the percentage of long term ill in the MSOA-level 
population. We also added mean house prices within a 20km radius of each home as an 




The results of the price estimations – the partial reduced form, (9) – are presented in Table 3. 
Table 4 has the quality estimation results i.e. of (8), including both the LPM and ordered probit 
model (OP) results. We used both a distance-weighted HHI (“HHIa”) and the distance and travel 
time-adjusted version (“HHIb”).12  
 The models all satisfied under-identification, weak-identification and over- identification 
tests13, except one price specification: the variant with 20km travel time competition: 20km – 
HHIb in Table 3.  
The coefficients on the home and LSOA level characteristics had the expected signs in both the 
price and quality estimations. As for regional effects, homes outside London were significantly 
cheaper. On average homes in the Home Counties were next most expensive, other things 
equal.  
Competition 
Competition decreases prices in care homes, using either the distance- or travel time-weighted 
HHI. For our preferred measure, 10km travel time-adjusted HHI, the price elasticity of 
concentration was 0.22 at the mean level of competition i.e. a 10% increase in competitiveness 
would correspond to a 2.2% decrease in prices, a reduction of around £12 per week. Elasticity 
was slightly lower for the distance-weighted measure (0.16). Using the 20km market definition, 
elasticity levels were greater. This result is consistent with hypothesis H4. 
                                                     
12 Travel time per kilometre is predicted using a general linear model regression of local council level travel time data 
using MSOA level population density and average house price as independent variables. The predicted values are then 
normalised by the average predicted travel time per km of the care home sample. 
13 For OP models a pseudo-Sargan test for over-identification was used based on the residuals calculated from the 
outcome-weighted predicted values from the estimation. 
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As regards hypothesis H1, we found that quality was positively related to concentration i.e. 
negatively related to competitiveness. This result held (at high significance levels) for both the 
LPM and ordered probit models, and for all of the concentration measures – see Table 4. The 
ordered probit allows us to explore the effects of competition on the probabilities of homes 
having particularly star ratings. In other words, we could look at whether competition was more 
likely to affect the chances of homes having high quality (3*) as opposed to low (0/1*) or 
moderate (2*). Figure 2 shows elasticity estimates using the 10km HHIb measure; this result 
does not suggest that competition effects are focused on homes in particular parts of the 
quality distribution. With a 10% increase in concentration, we would see fewer 0/1* homes and 
more 3* homes – some 0/1* homes would become 2* (or 3* homes) and a similar proportion 
of 2* homes as those moving up from 0/1* would become 3* homes.  
As regard hypothesis H2 using the estimation of (10), the results are in the first two columns of 
Table 6, with both 10km and 20km travel-time specifications of competition. In these 
estimations, competition was insignificant, a result which is consistent with our hypothesis. To 
further explore this result we added an interaction term, multiplying the (predicted values) of 
competition and price. The aim was to assess whether the marginal effects of competition on 
quality differ according to the price band in which the home operates. We do not have a direct 
measure of the proportion of clients in each care home that are publicly-funded as opposed to 
self-funded. The price bracket in which the home operates is a fair indicator of this, however; 
most homes that have the majority of their places publicly-funded will be in the lower part of 
the price distribution.14 Where this is the case, the theoretical model suggests that the lower-
priced homes market will show stronger negative effects of competition on quality than the 
higher-priced homes market. The sign of the interaction term of concentration (HHI) and price 
                                                     
14 We would assume that publicly-funded placements  that have a third party top-up are more likely to be in the higher 
part of the price distribution. 
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would then be negative. The results, given in the second part of Table 6, provide some support 
for hypotheses H3, with a significant negatively signed coefficient on the interaction term.  
Payer-composition 
The data did not allow direct observation of payer-composition in the locality of each home, 
raising the possibility of omitted variable endogeneity bias on the competition measure. We 
tackled this potential issue in three ways. First, we included a range of wealth factors in the 
empirical model that have been shown to be good predictors of payer-composition (Darton, 
Forder et al. 2010) e.g. house prices and rates of pension credit. Also, IV RESET tests give some 
indication of omitted variable problems but were not significant in any model. Second, ex post 
payer-composition (proportion of self-funded places) was available at local authority level (153 
in England) and was included (although noting potential ecological fallacy issues at this level of 
aggregation). Third, we tried alternative instrumentation of HHI (𝐻𝑖) in the model, specifically 
using primarily need-related excluded instruments: using proportion reporting ill-health at the 
MSOA level rather than house price at the MSOA level. The alternative models did not 
qualitatively change the results. 
Other factors 
The results show (Table 4) that the voluntary sector is associated with significantly greater 
levels of quality (and price) than the private sector. This finding is in line with the large, 
predominantly US, literature in this area (Comondore, Devereaux et al. 2009). Care homes that 
are primarily aimed at dementia clients have significantly lower levels of quality than their 
counterparts. The longer a care home has been registered and care homes that are purpose 
built are associated with higher quality. There is a price premium associated with a placement 





The extensive use of markets and private providers – often with a high degree of public funding 
– are characteristics of the nursing home industry in many countries, not least in England. And 
yet there is a relatively small literature investigating whether markets in long-term care ‘work’, 
and whether promoting competition is a beneficial policy. What research exists tends to paint a 
mixed picture.  
This analysis found a negative effect of competition on quality. We argue that competition can 
have a negative effect on quality if it pushes prices in the market down to the level where 
providers can only sustain the costs of minimum quality. Although providers are assumed to 
want to produce higher quality, other things equal, this break-even constraint can bind in 
competitive markets. This result only occurs if commissioners/buyers are predominantly 
interested in cost rather than quality (or at least any quality improvement above the minimum 
standard). The empirical analysis offers some support for these hypotheses. In particular, a 
negative effect of competition on quality is not found when price is included in the quality 
estimation. There is also some indication that the higher price end of the market is more 
responsive to quality – higher prices are generally paid by self-payers (or publicly-funded 
placements with third party top-ups) rather than public commissioners.  
The policy implications of this analysis on nursing home markets in England depend largely on 
judgements as to whether minimum quality standards are acceptable. If competition is pushing 
prices down such that providers are producing services at minimum quality, but this quality is 
acceptable to policy makers, then greater competition can be seen as beneficial. Such an 
interpretation can only be sustained, however, if we are confident that the (non-market) 
actions of the regulator are sufficient to maintain minimum quality levels. Without robust 
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regulation, and without a change in public commissioning behaviour, quality would deteriorate 
below acceptable levels.  
We have sought to tackle some of the empirical challenges identified in the literature, namely, 
finding appropriate ‘quality’ measures, measuring competition and addressing potential 
endogeneity. Nonetheless, limitations need to be recognised in these regards. We rely on 
regulatory information on quality which is likely to be a noisy and potentially arbitrary proxy of 
the final utility gain from being in a care home. We also make a number of simplifying 
assumptions about the impact of competitors on each home. Furthermore, although we use 
instrumental variables methods to address simultaneity issues, these are notoriously sensitive 
to instrument specification.  
As well as simultaneity, there were also potential endogeneity problems due to omitted 
variables, notably missing payer-composition variables at LSOA level. There is a potential issue 
with the competition variable embodying the effect of differences in payer composition on 
quality rather than competition effects. We addressed this problem by (a) using a range of 
wealth factors that have been shown to be good predictors of payer-composition (b) using 
payer-composition data at aggregated level (local authority) and (c) using alternative 
instruments for predicting HHI. In all cases, the result of a negative impact of competition on 
quality remained.  
In addition there were a number of limitations in the data; in particular, only having home-level 
average prices, not individual resident prices, and the usual missing values. We did, however, 
perform a number of robustness checks in this regard: first, we included the price outliers; 
second, we used maximum or minimum prices in place of mean price; third, we separated out 
care homes rated as poor (0 stars) and adequate (1 star); fourth, we treated all poor rated care 
homes (0 stars) as missing; and fifth, we randomly assigned a quality rating to the additional 
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care homes that were missing quality ratings but had price information.15 Our findings were not 
significantly altered in any of these scenarios.  
There are a number of avenues which future work could take in this area. A relevant limitation 
to address with further work is in not accounting for the heterogeneous nature of care homes 
in directly mediating competition effects. In particular we could examine organisational effects 
more thoroughly by accounting for care homes being run by the same group in the measure of 
competition, or examine competition assuming differentiation of markets for nursing homes 
and residential homes and/or care homes predominantly for older people and for those with 
dementia. In further work we will explore weighting our competition measure for these 
differences in care home type. The intercept effects with regard to some factors – e.g. 
dementia homes – could also reflect different applicability or implementation of quality 
assessment by the regulator, or perhaps insufficient case-mix adjustment for dementia homes. 
This analysis uses cross-sectional data – it should be possible to add further waves in order to 
explore the dynamic properties of the market (although the policy backdrop is changing and 
this limits continuity) and to help with omitted variables (e.g. payer-composition) limitations. 
The analysis would also benefit from finer grained price data (for example, differentiating by 
payer type), but this is not currently available from administrative sources. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1. Quality ratings and average care home prices  
    Home-average price (£ per week) 
Star rating n % mean median SD 
0/1* 1217 13.8% £522 £475 £163 
2* 5963 67.7% £526 £482 £157 
3* 1631 18.5% £572 £521 £191 
Residential (personal care) 5414 61.4% £466 £440 £111 
Nursing 3397 38.6% £642 £614 £181 
All homes 8811 100.0% £534 £488 £166 
 
Table 2. Independent variables – descriptive statistics 
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Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Endogenous      
Average price  8691 528.48 158.05 323.00 1900.00 
Star rating 8483 2.05 0.57 1.00 3.00 
HHIa 10km 8691 0.05 0.07 0.01 1.00 
HHIa 20km 8691 0.04 0.05 0.01 1.00 
HHIb 10km 8691 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.81 
HHIb 20km 8691 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.21 
Exogenous      
Care Home level      
Voluntary 8691 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Primary client: dementia 8691 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Nursing home 8691 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Years since registration  8691 20.38 6.13 2.00 64.00 
Purpose built 8691 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Care homes in organisational group: 3-9 8691 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Care homes in organisational group: 10-19 8691 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Care homes in organisational group: 20-49 8691 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Care homes in organisational group: 50+ 8691 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
LSOA level      
House price 8691 225081.50 144027.90 43568.17 3264864.00 
Proportion population over 60/65 8691 0.25 0.09 0.02 0.69 
Total population 8691 1620.37 327.79 814.00 6398.00 
Index of multiple dep. score rank   8691 16933.30 8755.68 1.00 32465.00 
Long-term limiting illness 8691 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.48 
Health fairly good  8691 0.23 0.04 0.11 0.37 
Over 60/65s pension credit uptake 8691 0.24 0.14 0.01 0.94 
Proportion self-funded residents in LA 8691 0.53 0.10 0.001 0.81 
Additional instruments      
House price MSOA  8691 201892.60 100534.70 48904.00 1374322.00 
Index of multiple dep. score rank  MSOA  8691 17068.96 7775.36 64.00 32244.60 





Table 3. Price regression results 
Market Radius 10km – HHIa 10km – HHIb 20km – HHIa 20km – HHIb 
  Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Competition         
HHI 2.935*** 0.346 4.933*** 0.582 20.330*** 4.161 39.239*** 10.470 
Care Home level         
Dementia clients 0.041*** 0.009 0.044*** 0.009 0.040*** 0.016 0.047*** 0.016 
Voluntary sector 0.033*** 0.010 0.026*** 0.010 0.024* 0.014 -0.014 0.023 
Nursing home 0.150*** 0.027 0.157*** 0.030 0.164*** 0.059 0.187*** 0.085 
Care home group 3-9 0.034*** 0.008 0.036*** 0.008 0.042*** 0.014 0.035** 0.016 
Care home group 10-19 0.054*** 0.012 0.044*** 0.013 0.060*** 0.018 0.048** 0.022 
Care home group 20-49 0.047*** 0.015 0.040*** 0.015 0.093*** 0.019 0.076*** 0.025 
Care home group 50+ 0.104*** 0.009 0.089*** 0.010 0.107*** 0.015 0.083*** 0.019 
Registration length (log) -0.086*** 0.011 -0.076*** 0.012 -0.074*** 0.018 -0.063*** 0.019 
log Registration length sq 4.5e-5*** 1.4e-5 4.7e-5*** 1.4e-5 3.4e-5* 1.8e-5 3.5e-5 2.2e-5 
Purpose built 0.016** 0.008 0.022*** 0.008 0.038*** 0.012 0.043*** 0.016 
LSOA level         
Percent older population -0.007*** 0.001 -0.007*** 0.001 -0.014*** 0.003 -0.012*** 0.004 
total population sq -9.5e-9*** 2.7e-9 -1.0e-8*** 2.8e-9 -2.0e-8*** 5.5e-9 -2.2e-8*** 7.4e-9 
Average house price (log) -1.166*** 0.218 -0.950*** 0.212 -2.435*** 0.457 -2.639*** 0.731 
log avg house price sq 0.051*** 0.009 0.043*** 0.009 0.104*** 0.019 0.115*** 0.030 
Deprivation rank (log) 0.049*** 0.009 0.028*** 0.007 0.095*** 0.019 0.062*** 0.020 
Percent long term ill 0.016*** 0.002 0.016*** 0.002 0.028*** 0.005 0.023*** 0.007 
Percent health fairly good -0.010*** 0.002 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.022*** 0.004 -0.019*** 0.006 
Percent pension credit -0.628*** 0.108 -0.622*** 0.109 -0.809*** 0.201 -0.765*** 0.238 
Percent pension credit sq 0.888*** 0.148 0.813*** 0.140 1.384*** 0.278 1.320*** 0.356 
Proportion self-funded residents in LA (log) 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.006 -0.032** 0.015 -0.055** 0.025 
Under-ident 116.805*** 121.013*** 60.978*** 37.803*** 
Weak Ident (F-test) 44.99*** 44.98*** 9.51*** 5.35*** 
Weak Ident (KP rk Wald F) 39.095a 41.536a 20.677b 13.020c 
Over-ident 2.594NS  1.019NS  2.477NS  13.769*** 
Reset (functional form) 0.05NS  0.98NS  0.38NS  2.04NS 
n = 8691, all models include region dummies. a Exceeds 5% maximal IV bias and 10% maximal IV size, b Exceeds 5% maximal IV bias and 15% maximal IV size, c exceeds 10% maximal IV bias and 15% maximal 




Table 4. Quality regression results 
Market Radius LPM 10km - HHIa LPM 10km - HHIb LPM 20km - HHIa LPM 20km - HHIb OP 10km - HHIb OP 20km - HHIb 
  Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Competition             
HHI 1.743*** 0.648 3.298*** 1.163 11.886** 4.674 31.025** 14.322 6.955*** 2.522 63.527** 32.274 
Care Home level             
Dementia clients -0.041** 0.018 -0.038** -0.019 -0.039* 0.020 -0.033 0.022 -0.084** 0.037 -0.077** 0.038 
Voluntary sector 0.157*** 0.022 0.154*** 0.022 0.151*** 0.023 0.125*** 0.030 0.320*** 0.046 0.258*** 0.053 
Nursing home -0.094 0.069 -0.090 0.070 -0.090 0.079 -0.071 0.106 -0.184 0.142 -0.138 0.142 
Care home group 3-9 -0.034* 0.018 -0.032* 0.018 -0.029 0.019 -0.031 0.021 -0.071* 0.036 -0.071** 0.036 
Care home group 10-19 -0.011 0.026 -0.017 0.027 -0.007 0.027 -0.016 0.030 -0.033 0.054 -0.031 0.054 
Care home group 20-49 -0.021 0.028 -0.027 0.029 0.008 0.029 0.002 0.033 -0.057 0.058 -0.002 0.057 
Care home group 50+ 0.006 0.020 -0.004 0.021 0.007 0.021 -0.011 0.026 -0.009 0.042 -0.024 0.045 
Registration length (log) 0.043*** 0.016 0.051*** 0.016 0.048*** 0.017 0.058*** 0.020 0.106*** 0.033 0.119*** 0.034 
Purpose built 0.045*** 0.017 0.049*** 0.017 0.059*** 0.018 0.068*** 0.022 0.104*** 0.035 0.141*** 0.039 
LSOA level             
Percent older population 2.7e-4 0.002 1.4e-4 0.002 -0.005 0.004 -0.007 0.006 4.0e-4 0.005 -0.013 0.010 
total population sq -3.3e-9 4.7e-9 -4.4e-9 4.9e-9 -1.1e-8 6.3e-9 -1.7e-8 1.1e-8 -9.6e-9 1.0e-8 -3.4e-8 1.8e-8 
Average house price (log) 0.015 0.025 0.027 0.024 0.045* 0.026 0.101** 0.041 0.056 0.049 0.205*** 0.072 
Deprivation rank  4.9e-7 1.8e-6 -1.3e-6 1.7e-6 4.3e-6 2.7e-6 2.3e-6 2.6e-6 -2.7e-6 3.4e-6 4.6e-6 4.4e-6 
Percent long term ill 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.012* 0.008 0.015 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.029* 0.018 
Percent health fairly good -0.006 0.004 -0.007* 0.004 -0.011** 0.006 -0.015* 0.008 -0.015* 0.009 -0.030** 0.014 
Percent living alone (log) 0.047 0.035 0.029 0.034 0.036 0.036 -0.025 0.047 0.059 0.071 -0.053 0.084 
Percent pension credit (log) -0.058* 0.030 -0.064** 0.030 -0.057* 0.032 -0.070* 0.038 -0.137** 0.063 -0.137** 0.065 
Percent pension credit sq -0.012 0.118 -1.6e-4 0.118 0.148 0.148 0.331 0.231 0.012 0.248 0.677 0.417 
Proportion SF residents (log) 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.018 -0.007 0.023 -0.036 0.036 0.034 0.038 -0.070 0.064 
Under-ident 98.456***  101.241***  99.430***  109.045***      
Weak Ident (F-test) 13.33***  14.91***  16.32***  20.51***  42.29***  4.89***  
Weak Ident (KP rk Wald F) 32.686a  33.703a  33.168a  36.579a      
Over-ident 2.214NS  1.210NS  1.405NS  2.236NS  1.164NS  3.218NS  
Reset (functional form) 0.48NS  0.51NS  0.22NS  0.14NS  
    
n = 8483, all models include region dummies. a Exceeds 5% maximal IV bias and 10% maximal IV size (Stock and Yogo 2005). LPM models estimated using the ivreg2 command for Stata (Baum, 
Schaffer et al. 2010). 
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Table 5. Price regression results - elasticities 
Competition 
measure HHIa - 10km HHIb - 10km HHIa - 20km HHIb - 20km 
Mean 0.156 0.215 0.347 0.561 




Table 6. Quality regression – price interaction results (ordered probit models)  
Market Radius Price control Interaction 
 10km 20km 10km 20km 
  Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Competition         
Predicted HHI 3.509 3.861 -0.267 2.886 47.679** 21.248 115.325** 57.176 
Predicted price (log) 0.314 0.859 1.038** 0.479 0.683 0.866 1.276*** 0.484 
Pred HHI*Pred price (log)     -7.114** 3.347 -18.528** 9.150 
Care Home level         
Dementia clients -0.103* 0.053 -0.137*** 0.041 -0.108** 0.053 -0.138*** 0.041 
Voluntary sector 0.312*** 0.052 0.292*** 0.048 0.309*** 0.052 0.293*** 0.048 
Nursing home -0.228 0.195 -0.342** 0.163 -0.236 0.195 -0.337** 0.163 
Care home group 3-9 -0.085* 0.048 -0.113*** 0.039 -0.087* 0.048 -0.112*** 0.039 
Care home group 10-19 -0.042 0.068 -0.075 0.060 -0.044 0.068 -0.074 0.060 
Care home group 20-49 -0.059 0.069 -0.088 0.066 -0.059 0.069 -0.086 0.066 
Care home group 50+ -0.029 0.088 -0.093 0.065 -0.033 0.088 -0.090 0.065 
Registration length (log) 0.119** 0.057 0.157*** 0.044 0.116** 0.057 0.152*** 0.044 
Purpose built 0.095** 0.039 0.077** 0.036 0.093** 0.039 0.078** 0.036 
LSOA level         
Percent older population 0.006 0.005 0.010*** 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.009*** 0.003 
Average house price (log) 0.023 0.101 -0.053 0.076 0.014 0.101 -0.056 0.076 
Deprivation rank -2.4e-6 3.4e-6 -1.5e-6 3.3e-6 -2.6e-6  3.4e-6 -1.3e-6  3.3e-6  
Percent long term ill (log) -0.028 0.240 -0.227** 0.115 -0.039 0.240 -0.222* 0.115 
Percent health fairly good -0.008 0.011 0.001 0.007 -0.007 0.011 0.001 0.007 
Percent living alone 0.126 0.200 0.022 0.170 0.116 0.201 0.023 0.170 
Percent pension credit (log) -0.092 0.084 -0.031 0.054 -0.091 0.084 -0.036 0.054 
Proportion SF residents (log) 0.033 0.038 0.032 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.032 0.038 
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